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WARDS COVE PACKING CO. v. ATONIO: THE
SUPREME COURT'S DISPARATE
TREATMENT OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT
DOCTRINE
Niall A. Paul*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1971 with its decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' the Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642
forbids any seemingly neutral employment practice from denying
employment opportunity to minorities and women unless such practice was instituted because of a business necessity.'
In 1988, with its decision in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and
Trust, the Court extended the disparate impact analysis to subjective
criteria as well as objective employment standards.4 To some, this
decision represented an expansion of civil rights protection, but it
also advocated a shifting of burdens in all disparate impact cases.,
Watson suggested that the plaintiffs in disparate impact cases be required to prove that the challenged employment practice was not
justified by a business need.6 Thus, the Court would have forced the
plaintiff to prove the negative, instead of requiring the defendant to
prove business necessity.'
* Niall Paul graduated cum laude from Bridewater College, where he received his B.A.
in Philosophy and Religion; and from the University of Richmond, where he received his J.D.
Mr. Paul is an Associate at Spilman, Thomas, Battle and Klostermeyer, assisting employers
and management with labor and employment law issues.
I. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1978).
3. 401 U.S. at 430-31.
4. 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opinion). Before Watson, the circuits were split on this
issue. Id. at 982. The majority held that when an employer used subjective criteria in hiring,
the disparate impact theory did not apply. Id. at 986.
5. Watson, 487 U.S. at 986. With the addition of Justice Kennedy to the Supreme
Court, the Watson plurality's position soon became law. See infra note 8 and accompanying
text.
6. Watson, 487 U.S. at 977.
7. Because the courts felt that the employer was in a better position to demonstrate why
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In 1989, a Supreme Court majority made the Watson plurality
decision the law, and rejected eighteen years of Griggs and its progeny, with its decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.8 The
Wards Cove Court shifted the burden of persuasion of the business
necessity issue to the plaintiffs and also severely limited the long
standing use of statistical evidence in demonstrating discrimination.
The Court dealt a final blow to the disparate impact plaintiff by
changing the employer's explanation of the disparity from one of
business necessity to one of a simple, rational, business
justification. 10
Reaction to Wards Cove has been fast and furious. Many Title
VII plaintiffs have been turned away by the new standards.1" The
lower courts have implemented the new standard acknowledging a
new era for the Title VII plaintiff.12 Members of Congress have also
responded to Wards Cove.' 3
This Article discusses the disparate impact standard of Griggs
and its progeny' 4 and compares it to the new standard of Wards
Cove. 5 It analyzes the federal circuit court decisions applying the
Wards Cove standard16 and discusses congressional reaction
it had set its own policies, the standard prior to Watson was that once an employee established
a prima facie case, the employer then had to carry the burden of persuasion and demonstrate
that there was a business necessity requiring him to adopt the challenged employment criterion. The Court later lowered the standard from business necessity to business justification.
See infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
8. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
9. Id. The Court limited statistical evidence in two dramatic ways. Id. First, the Court
rejected the use of "infra work force comparison" (the percentage of minorities in management as compared to the percent of minorities in the manual labor force). Id. Wards Cove
Packing Company had no minority managers, yet its labor force was almost all minorities. Id.
The Court also demanded that the plaintiff not only show a statistical disparity but also
pinpoint the specific causation of the disparity. Id.
10. 109 S. Ct. at 2115.
I1. See, e.g., Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1388
(1989) (rejecting the prima facie case because plaintiffs faulted the entire promotional
process).
12. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
13. Among those bills introduced following Wards Cove, two have the greatest chance of
success and are the two most publicized. One is the Fair Employment Reinstatement Act,
sponsored by Senator Metzenbaum. See infra notes 239-63 and accompanying text. The second is the Civil Rights Act of 1990, sponsored by Senators Kennedy, Jeffords, Metzenbaum,
Derenberger, Gore, Hatfield, Mikulksi, Packwood, Pell, Simon, Adams, Biden, Bingaman,
Bradley, Burdick, Cohen, Conrad, Cranston, Dodd, Fowler, Harkin, Inouye, Kerrey, Kohl,
Lautenberg, Leahy, Levin, Matsunaga, Mitchell, Moynihan, Riegle, Sarbanes, Specter, and
Wirth. See infra notes 265-73 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 20-59 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 61-152 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 154-237 and accompanying text.
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thereto. 17 This Article will conclude that Wards Cove has drastically
changed, and perhaps eliminated, the viable disparate impact standard established by Griggs."s Finally, this Article will argue that

Wards Cove should be dismantled.' 9

II. GRIGGS V. DUKE POWER CO.:
THE TRADITIONAL DISPARATE IMPACT STANDARD.

The disparate impact theory of recovery of Title VII was announced by the Supreme Court in Griggs.20 The Griggs Court articulated for the first time the prima facie requirements of, and defenses to, a disparate impact claim of discrimination. 2 ' Under this
theory of liability, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that a facially

neutral employment practice was operating in a discriminatory manner.2 2 This can be shown by establishing a statistical disparity in how
the practice affected the members of a protected class and how the
same practice affected whites.23
The disparate impact theory differs significantly from the disparate treatment theory of Title VII liability, which focuses on the intent of the employer. 24 The disparate impact theory focuses on the

impact and consequences 25of the employer's actions and policies, not
on the employer's intent.

In Griggs, the employer had a history of work force segrega17. See infra notes 239-73 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 274-316 and accompanying text. One of the more insidious changes
that Wards Cove makes is that it forces almost all plaintiffs to demonstrate a less discriminatory alternative to the employer's practices. 109 S. Ct. at 2115. While this may not seem like
too arduous a task, no Title VII plaintiff has ever won a disparate impact case by demonstrating a less discriminatory alternative. See infra notes 122-39 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 237-73 and accompanying text.
20. 401 U.S. at 424.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). It should be noted that
direct evidence of discriminatory intent is not needed under this standard. Id. at 804-07. A
plaintiff may prove that an employer's proffered reason for the disparate treatment of a minority employee was a pretext by demonstrating intent with circumstantial evidence of racial (or
protected class) animus, thus implying the intent. Id.
The prima facie case of disparate treatment requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that: 1)
she is in a protected class; 2) that she applied for and was qualified for the job; 3) that she was
rejected; and 4) that the employer hired a non-protected class member or that the job remained open. Id. at 802. The employer then has to offer a rational non-discriminatory reason
for the hiring decision. Id. At this point, the plaintiff may attempt to prove pretext, as outlined
above. Id. at 804. Though jurisdictions differ, the prima facie case generally involves a plaintiff
demonstrating that he was similarly situated to a non-minority employee but was treated
differently.
25. At least this was the case before Wards Cove. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2119.
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tion.28 The company had five categories of jobs, one being labor intensive and the others being "operational. 2 7 The employer had relegated blacks to the labor department and allowed only whites to
advance through the "operational" ranks.2 8 Despite the employer's
abandonment of outright discrimination, of the 95 persons employed
at the time of the suit, 15 were black and they were all in the labor
department.2"
The employer had put certain requirements in place for the operational fields.30 One was a high school diploma and the other two
were satisfactory scores on two professionally prepared aptitude
tests. 31 "Neither [test] was . . . intended to measure the ability to

learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs. The requisite
scores used for both initial hiring and transfer approximated the national median for high school graduates. 3 2 The employer asserted
that in his judgment, the tests would be helpful in securing quality
personnel, and that any resulting racial disparity was an indication
of the quality of the applicant. 3
Griggs was the first case in which the Court extended Title VII
protection against the disparate impact of employment practices. 3
The Court rejected the employer's argument that the plaintiffs had
to prove that the employer had intended to discriminate. 3a
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. .

.

. Neither the high school

completion requirement nor the general intelligence test is shown
to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of
the jobs for which it was used.36
26. 401 U.S. at 427.
27.

Id.

28. Id.
29. Id. at 426.
30. Id. at 424.
31. Id. at 424-25.
32. Id. at 428.
33. Id. at 431. Since Duke Power Co. had a policy of helping its employees to pay for
courses taken toward a high school degree, the Court stated that the company probably lacked
any intent to discriminate with its requirements. Id. The effect of Duke Power Co.'s requirements were clear, however, and the Court held that the disparity caused by the requirements

was nonetheless discriminatory and therefore illegal.
34.

Id.

Id. at 428.

35.

Id. at 432.

36.

Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
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The Court rejected the employer's "judgment" that the test
would improve quality. 7 The employer argued that no intent was
shown because the tests were administered for sound business reasons.38 The Court held that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act
to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. More than that, Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest
relationship to the employment in question."3
The Court thus found that the simple articulation of a business
reason would not be enough. Griggs required the employer to shoulder the burden of proving that any given requirement has a manifest
relationship to the employment in question.40 Since the employer's
tests were not shown to be indicative of potential for job performance, the Court held for the plaintiffs.41
This business necessity defense for the employers was further
defined in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 42 in which the Court established what many have labeled a tripartite framework for disparate impact cases. 43 The three steps are: 1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that an employment practice
systematically screened out substantially more-protected individuals
than non-protected individuals; 44 2) the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that the practice is job-related;4 5 and 3) the plaintiff must then be given an opportunity to offer other practices which
could accomplish the employer's stated goal in a less discriminatory
manner. 4s This third step was offered by the Court because the Act
and the intent of Congress focuses on the consequences of employment decisions, not only on the motive behind those decisions.47
Albemarle added another burden for the employer to bear,
holding that the employer must scientifically or professionally validate the accuracy or effectiveness of the test used to make the em37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
Proof in
44.
that the
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 431-32.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 436.
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
See Note, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust: Reallocating the Burdens of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 919, 930 (1989).
Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 425. See infra notes 61-94 and accompanying text (noting
use of statistics has been severely limited by Wards Cove).
Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
Id.
id.
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ployment determination.48 What Albemarle tried to clarify was the
shifting of burdens between the parties.4 Even after Albemarle, it
was not clear whether the shifted burden was a burden of production
of evidence, a burden of persuasion, or a simple articulation of a
rationale.5" In Dothardv. Rawlinson,5 1 the Court had an opportunity
to rectify this uncertainty. The majority in Dothard held that the
employer must introduce evidence of enough strength to demonstrate
that the practice being defended was essential to job performance. 2
Despite this ruling, some courts relied on Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Dothardto hold that the employer's burden is only one of
articulating a legitimate business purpose."
In disparate treatment cases, all an employer must do to rebut a
prima facie case is articulate a non-discriminatory business reason.5 4
In disparate impact cases, however, the Court seemingly asks more
of the employer. 55 While Griggs uses the word "articulate" to describe the employer's burden, 56 Albemarle and Dothard follow up
with a requirement that the employer introduce enough evidence to
establish a business necessity. 57 It is evident from these opinions that
the Court was demanding that the employer offer more than a
pretextual reason. The Court insisted that the employer at least offer
the requisite evidence to convince the trier of fact that the challenged practice was required by a business necessity.5 8 This discussion, however, may be moot, as Wards Cove has stated that a simple
articulation of a business justification is enough to force the plaintiff
48. Id. at 430. The problem with validation and Wards Cove will be addressed later. See
infra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
49. See generally Note, supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing lower courts'

views of the burdens in disparate impact cases).
50.
51.
52.
employer

Id.
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
Id. at 331. This was an important decision because the Court indicated that the
must persuade the Court that the challenged practice was essential to the job. Id.

When the Court indicated that an employer must introduce evidence of "requisite strength", it
implied a burden of persuasion. Id.
53. See Note, supra note 43, at 935 n.106 (citing Crocker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975,
991 (3d Cir. 1981) (defining defendants' burdens as the burden to come forward with, or offer
evidence of a manifest relationship)); NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1333
(3d Cir. 1981) (deciding that the ultimate burden of persuasion always remains with plaintiffs
in both disparate impact and disparate treatment cases).
54. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
55. Id.
56. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
58. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 (noting that the business necessity requirement is
much more of a burden than that of a reasonable non-discriminatory reason).
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to continue.59
III.

WARDS COVE-THE NEW DIMENSION OF THE DISPARATE
IMPACT DOCTRINE

The Court, used Wards Cove to dismantle much of what had
been known or understood about Title VII and disparate impact.
Wards Cove involved a salmon cannery in Alaska which recruited its
workers for unskilled cannery line jobs from nearby villages and
union halls. 60 In his dissent, Justice Stevens discusses the facts of
Wards Cove, stating,
To fill their employment requirements, petitioners must recruit and
transport many cannery workers and noncannery workers from
states in the Pacific Northwest. . . . Employees in the noncannery
positions-the positions that are "at issue"-learn of openings by
word of mouth; the jobs seldom are posted or advertised, and there
is no promotion to noncannery jobs from within the cannery workers' ranks.6 '

On-line cannery positions were predominantly filled by nonwhite employees, and non-cannery positions were completely filled by
white employees.6 2 The non-white cannery workers and the white
non-cannery employees were housed in separate dormitory build-

ings. 3 The plaintiffs alleged that this contributed to the failure of
the cannery workers to find out about openings in non-cannery
positions. 4
The overwhelming statistical disparity between the non-white

cannery employees and white non-cannery employees was rejected
by the trial court.65 The trial court stated that the proper comparison
should be between the number of non-whites in the general population of Alaska, the Pacific Northwest and California, and the number of non-whites in the "at issue" jobs. 6
59. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124. See infra notes 102-22 and accompanying text
(discussing the business justification test in detail).
60. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2119.
61. 109 S. Ct. at 2133. The majority and the dissent must be read together to get a clear
picture of the facts.
62. 109 S. Ct. at 2119.
63. 109 S. Ct. at 2135.
64. 109 S. Ct. at 2120.
65. Id.
66. 109 S. Ct. at 2134. The general rule on statistical evidence was set out in Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977). Hazelwood held that statistical evidence of discrimination should compare the racial composition of employees in the jobs at issue
to that "of the qualified . . . population in the relevant labor market." Id. (emphasis added).
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Justice Stevens noted that the case of Hazelwood School District v. United States 7 and several of its progeny indicate that the
relevant labor market should not be the general population. 8 According to Justice Stevens, Hazelwood "left open the definition of
the qualified population and the relevant labor market. Our previous
opinions . . . demonstrate that in reviewing statistical evidence, a
court should not strive for numerical exactitude at the expense of the
needs of the particular case."'6 9
Justice Stevens stated that the relevant, qualified labor pool
must consider the available labor supply.70 Since the cannery jobs
are seasonal, Justice Stevens argued that "[a]n undisputed requirement for employment either as a cannery or non-cannery worker is
availability for seasonal employment in the far reaches of
Alaska. . . . Yet the record does not identify the portion of the general population in Alaska, California and the Pacific Northwest that
would accept this type of employment." ' 71 Justice Stevens argued,
contrary to the majority, that comparisons between cannery workers
and non-cannery workers may be the best actual comparison available, since the current work force has demonstrated their availability
and qualifications. 7
The majority in Wards Cove held that "the comparison between
the racial composition of the cannery work force and that of the noncannery work force, as probative of a prima facie case of disparate
impact in the selection of the latter group of workers was flawed for
several reasons." '73 The Court stated that, "if the percentage of selected applicants who are non-white is not significantly less than the
percentage of qualified applicants who are non-white, the employer's
selection mechanism probably does not operate with a disparate impact on minorities. '74
The plaintiff in this case alleged that a wide disparity was
caused at Wards Cove by a variety of hiring and promotion practices, among which were nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of ob67. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
68. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2134-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. 109 S. Ct. at 2133 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
70. 109 S. Ct. at 2134-35.
71. 109 S. Ct. at 2134.
72. 109 S. Ct. at 2133-34.
73. 109 S. Ct. at 2121-22.
74, 109 S. Ct. at 2123. But see 109 S. Ct. at 2122 n.7, wherein the Court qualifies
this
terribly misleading comment. The statement falsely implies that a bottom line statistical
count
is proof of no discrimination. See id. Despite the explanatory note, this expression
may be
indicative of the true thinking of the current Court.
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jective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels for labor and management, and a practice of not promoting from within the
m The plaintiffs also complained of racially-segregated
company.7
housing and dining facilities.7 6 Wards Cove used primarily subjective
criteria when hiring, but the plaintiffs alleged that subjective criteria
used to choose amongst the candidates, and the methods used to
identify candidates, created the disparate impact. 77 The Court ultimately rejected this argument.7 8
The Court rejected the statistical proof offered by the plaintiffs
and ordered a remand,7 and in remanding this case the Court used
the opportunity to adopt the plurality's view in Watson.s" Finally,
the Court made into law the new standards concerning the element
of causation in a disparate impact case and the shifting of burdens in
the business justification stage.8 ' Wards Cove extensively quotes the
Watson opinion and notes that "[t]he law in this respect was correctly stated by Justice O'Connor's opinion last [t]erm in Watson v.
. The Wards Cove court states:
Fort Worth Bank & Trust...
We note that the plaintiff's burden in establishing a prima facie
case goes beyond the need to show that there are statistical disparities in the employer's work force. The plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employment act that is challenged. . . . Especially in cases where an employer combines subjective criteria with
the use of more rigid standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is in
our view responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed
statistical disparities.8"
The Wards Cove Court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet
their burden of causally linking the practices with the impact because they offered "'only [one] set of cumulative comparative statistics as evidence of the disparate impact of each and all of [petitioners' hiring] practices.' ",84 The Court issued a warning to future Title
75.

109 S. Ct. at 2120.

76. Id.
77. Id.
78.

Id.

79. Id.
80. 487 U.S. at 977.
81. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2121.
82. 109 S. Ct. at 2124.
83. Id. (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 (Blackmun, J.)).
84. Id. (citation omitted). The Court demanded that the plaintiffs identify which one of
the hiring practices caused the discrimination, and did not allow the plaintiffs to argue that all
of them, together, caused the vast disparity. Id.
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VII plaintiffs, stating that,
[E]ven if on remand [the] respondents can show that non-whites
are under represented in the at-issue jobs in a manner that is acceptable under the [new statistical standards] this alone will not
suffice to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact. Respondents will also have to demonstrate that the disparity they complain of is the result of one or more of the employment practices
[being attacked], specifically showing that each challenged practice
has a significantly disparate impact on employment opportunities
for whites and nonwhites.85
The Court acknowledged that it might receive criticism for this
new requirement of specific causation, but said that the additional
burden would be lessened by the existence of liberal discovery rules
that allow plaintiffs access to the employer's records. 86
Justice Stevens responded in his dissent to this new prima facie
case requirement with the criticism the Court had anticipated. 87 Justice Stevens conceded that the elementary rule of law that there
must be a causal relationship between the plaintiff's injury and the
defendant's action must apply to Title VII actions.8 8 He noted however, that while "the causal link must have substance, the act need
not constitute the sole or primary cause of the harm. . . . Thus in a
disparate impact case, proof of numerous questionable employment
practices ought to fortify an employee's assertion that the practices

caused racial disparities." 89 Justice Stevens further rejected the majority's reliance on liberal discovery rules, stating that while plaintiffs may ordinarily gain access through discovery rules to the defendants' statistical personnel records, "it is undisputed that the
petitioners [in this case] did not preserve such records." 90
85. 109 S. Ct. at 2125. See infra notes 235-54 and accompanying text for Congressional
response. Prior to this decision, it was widely believed that the employer had to eliminate each
challenged practice from the group by establishing either that each individual practice did not
cause the disparity or that each individual practice was created by business necessity. 109 S.
Ct. at 2125. The proposed statutes would definitely give this burden to the employer. Id.
86. 109 S. Ct. at 2125 (acknowledging once again that Wards Cove might not be widely
accepted as a "good" decision).
87.. 109 S. Ct. at 2127-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. 109 S. Ct. at 2132.
89. 109 S. Ct. at 2132-33 (citations omitted).
90. 109 S. Ct. at 2133 n.20. The majority concedes this point in a footnote which states,
"[o]f course, petitioners' obligation to collect or retain any of this data may be limited by the
Guidelines themselves. See 29 CFR § 1602.14(b) (1988) (exempting 'seasonal' jobs from certain record-keeping requirements)." 109 S. Ct. at 2125 n.10. From a footnote such as this, it is
evident that the court was writing with more in mind than the adjudication of Wards Cove.
The Court has given away its intention to revamp the rules on these facts without mentioning
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With its ruling, the Court rejected a plaintiff's reliance on statistical proof of imbalance and the highlighting of questionable employment practices as meeting the prima facie requirements.91 For a
disparate impact plaintiff to make out a prima facie case, the Court
insisted that the questioned practice be proven to cause the statistical
disparity.92 Justice Stevens insisted that Griggs' prima facie case was
much less of a burden, 93 requiring only that the plaintiff demonstrate
that some employment practice of the employer resulted in a disparate impact upon a protected class.9 4 According to the Court, plaintiffs who prove that a process, as a whole, excludes minorities, but
who fail to identify the specific steps of that process which cause the
disparity, fail also to prove discrimination.95
If, somehow, a plaintiff can meet the new prima facie burden,
the employer must then articulate a business justification. 8 Wards
Cove changed the burden of the employer from one of persuasion, or
close to persuasion, to one of production. 97 The Court admitted that
several of its cases could be read to indicate a burden of persuasion
on the employer.9 8 "But to the extent that those cases speak of an
employer's 'burden of proof' with respect to a legitimate business
justification defense.

. .

they should have been understood to mean

an employer's production-but not persuasion-burden." 99 According to the Court, the burden of persuasion must always remain with
the plaintiff.100 Thus, the plaintiff must prove that the questioned
practices are not justified by business needs.101
In addition to shifting the burden to the plaintiff, the Court also
takes the opportunity to decrease the level to which the employer's
within the opinion itself the fatal effect this rule had on the plaintiffs.
91. 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
92. Id.

93. 109 S. Ct. at 2129.
94. Id.
95.

109 S. Ct. at 2125.

96. Id.
97.

109 S. Ct. at 2126. Some may say that this was not a change at all but a clarifica-

tion of the original intent of Griggs. As discussed supra, this author rejects that analysis and
relies on Dothard to demonstrate a burden greater than that of production. See supra notes
51-58 and accompanying text. The Wards Cove decision simply says that Dothard and its
progeny, when they said or implied "burden of proof," "should have been understood to mean
an employer's production - but not persuasion - burden." 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
98. id.
99. Id. (citation omitted) Justice White fails to explain why the Court's earlier language was wrong or misunderstood. Id. He simply rejects it and proposes a different version.

Id.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
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"defense" must rise.1"2 The employer no longer needs argue that the
questioned practice is justified by business necessity.10 3 "[T]here is
no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass muster."'0 With
this, the Court rejected the business necessity test of Griggs and Albemarle'015 and established the much lower standard of producing
evidence of a simple business reason or justification for the practice. 10 The reduction of the employer's burdens and "defenses" creates other problems for disparate impact plaintiffs.
In reducing the business necessity defense to a business justification articulation, Wards Cove also seemingly rejects Albemarle's
insistence for formal validation of any test or standards used for hiring."17 Albemarle concluded that employment practices that impact
on a protected group are unlawful unless they are shown by competent methods to be significantly correlated with important business
needs related to the jobs in question. 08
The Court in Albemarle rejected the company's "validation"
because it was vague and ambiguous. 0 9 The Court held that:
[W]hile the Company contends that the [challenged] [t]ests were
"locally validated" when they were introduced, no record of this
validation was made. Plant officials could recall only the barest
outlines of the alleged validation. Job relatedness cannot be proved
through vague and unsubstantiated hearsay." 0
The Court's final conclusion was a mandate to the employer:
The message of these guidelines is the same as that of the Griggs
case, that discriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown, by
professionally acceptable methods, to be "predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which
comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are
being evaluated."''
102. 109 S. Ct. at 2126. The Court went to great pains to reason that the employer's
burden was not in the form of an affirmative defense. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Griggs held that, because of discrimination's insidious character, if a business is
going to be allowed to discriminate against a protected class, then the justification must be the
narrow one of necessity. 401 U.S. at 432.
106. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
107. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
108. Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 431; see Note, supra note 43, at 933 (discussing Albermarie).
109. 422 U.S. at 430.
I10. Id. at 428 n.23.
Ill. Id. at 431 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4) (emphasis added).
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It is important to note that the Court insisted that the validity
of the tests "should be determined on subjects who are at the age or
in the same educational or vocational situation as the persons for
whom the test is recommended in practice.""' 2
Watson and Wards Cove, when read together, disregard Albemarle and its insistence on validation for hiring practices. 1 3 They
provide that employers need not validate subjective or objective criteria in order to demonstrate their accuracy and ability to predict
on-the-job performance." 4 Wards Cove states there is "no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to
the employer's business for it to pass muster ... "1,5
For authority, the Court cited the plurality opinion in Watson."' Watson makes the rejection of the validation requirement
very clear." 7 The Watson Court reasons that because the objective
test was never required to be formally validated the subjective test
should not be either."" The Court in Watson further states that an
employer can easily validate subjective criteria by indicating why
personal preferences are related to job performances." 9
112. Id. at 435 (quoting American Psychological Association, Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals, § C5.4 (1966)). Although validation does not
play a significant role in the Wards Cove decision, the Court does show the signs of a total
retreat from any stringent requirement on the employer to justify its actions. 109 S. Ct. at
2115.
113. See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
114. Id.
115. 109 S. Ct. at 2126. The idea that validation has been rejected by the Court has to
be tempered with the Court's reliance on "liberal civil discovery rules." The Court stated:
Some will complain that this specific causation requirement is unduly burdensome
on Title VII plaintiffs. But liberal civil discovery rules give plaintiffs broad access to
employers' records in an effort to document their claims. Also, employers falling
within the scope of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29
CFR § 1607.1 et seq. (1988) are required to "maintain . . .records or other information which will disclose the impact which its test and other selection procedures
have upon employment opportunities of persons by identifiable race, sex or ethnic
group[s].
Id. at 2125. This reliance by the Court upon the Uniform Guidelines to justify its opinion may
be a ticking time bomb for employers. While the court's overall "attitude" has shifted to
"favor" the employer, this focus on the Guidelines may indicate an increased importance for
the Guidelines' role in employment, discrimination cases. In fact, regulation 1607.5 General
Standards for Validity of Studies insists upon a very thorough and extensive validation study
on each selection process. It is important to note that if the lower courts give these Guidelines
credence, and employers will have a tough time validating their selection criterion. Additionally, employers will be required to keep on hand, for- easy access, all the information the
Guidelines require.
116. 487 U.S. at 981.
117. Id. at 985.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 986.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

13

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 8:1

[E]mployers are not required, even when defending standardized or
objective tests, to introduce formal "validation studies" showing
that particular criteria predict actual on-the-job performance
S. .. In the context of subjective or discretionaryemployment decisions, the employer will often find it easier than in the case of
standardized tests to produce evidence of a manifest relationship
to the employment in question.20

Disparate impact has all but been disma,4tld by Wards Cove.
The court did, however, leave relatively undist4rked the opportunity
for a plaintiff to prevail by countering a business justification with a
less discriminatory alternative.' 2 ' In order to prevail, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the alternative is equally effective in evaluating employees, and has a less discriminatory impact of the employer's current procedures.122
Albemarle indicated that this was an important opportunity for
the disparate impact plaintiff. 2 ' This "better alternative" test gave
minorities another way to gain Title VII protection. 2 4 The complaining party must show that "other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy
workmanship'.

. .

. Such a showing would be evidence that the em-

ployer was using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination."' 2 5
The Court in Wards Cove did not resist its opportunity to limit
the less discriminatory alternative option of a plaintiff, emphasizing
the economic and management concerns of the employer.1 6
Any alternative proposed by the plaintiff must be equally effective
as [the defendants'] chosen hiring procedures in achieving [the de-

fendants'] legitimate employment goals. . . . [T~he judiciary
should proceed with care before mandating that an employer must
adopt a plaintiff's alternate selection or hiring practice in response
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 997-98 (emphasis added).
109 S. Ct. at 2126-27.
Id.
422 U.S. at 425.
Id.
422 U.S. at 425 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05). The Seventh

Circuit addressed this change in Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989). In that case,
the court noted that under Wards Cove, a plaintiff could defeat the business justification test
by showing a less exclusionary practice. Id. at 377. The Allen court, however, did not accept
such an alternative, possibly because it took note of the Supreme Court's stern warning to
proceed with care before mandating that an employer must adopt what could be considered a
less restrictive alternative. Id.
126. 109 S. Ct. at 2127.
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to a Title VII Suit. 12 7

The Wards Cove majority relied on the Watson plurality decision in formulating this restrictive rule. 128 The Court further warned

that the judiciary must consider the cost of the alternatives when
assessing their usefulness and cautioned the lower courts against for-

getting the profit motive that drives the economy.129 The Court
quoted Watson, saying that "factors such as the cost or other bur-

dens of proposed aieernative selection devices are relevant in determining whether they would be equally as effective as the challenged
practice in serving the employer's legitimate business goals."' 130
"Courts are generally less competent than employers to restructure
business practices [citation omitted] . . .consequently, the judiciary should proceed with care before mandating that an employer
must adopt a plaintiffs alternative selection or hiring practice in
3
response to a Title VII suit."' 1
Watson also stated that these factors "would also be relevant in

determining whether the challenged practice has operated as the
functional equivalent of a pretext for discriminatory treatment."' 32
In other words, a plaintiff would also have to show that the business
justification articulated by an employer did not carry a large economic gain that would be lost by any changes. Wards Cove and

Watson placed an extensive burden on Title VII plaintiffs attempting
to rebut the employer's justification with a less discriminatory alter-

native, because under the new economic view, if the alternative is
less discriminatory, just as efficient, and a little more costly, then the
plaintiff still fails.' 3
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
129. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127.
130. Id.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. 487 U.S. at 985. It is important to note the Court's language when referring to an
employer's potentially dishonest defense as a "pretext." Id. at 985. Pretext is the language of
disparate treatment. Id. at 980. Under that theory, once an employee establishes a prima facie
case, a rebuttable presumption of unlawful discrimination arises. Id. at 983. If an employer
then rebuts the presumption with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the employee is given
the opportunity to show that the reason given is really a "pretext." Id. The disparate impact
model previously required more than a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason: it required a business necessity in order to rebut the prima facie case. Id. The Court's use of the word "pretext"
in a disparate impact model demonstrates the Court's blurring of the line between the two
theories. This is so because in past disparate impact cases, if an employer articulated a business necessity defense, then the employee did not have an opportunity to show "pretext." Id. at
985. Instead, an employee could defeat this proven "necessity" only by showing a less discriminatory alternative. Id.
133. See, e.g., Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2127. Even before this "new economic view,"
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As initially conceived in Albemarle, a plaintiff's showing of a
less discriminatory alternative meant success for a plaintiff even
though an employer had shown the challenged practice to be job related and necessary. 3 From this it is clear that the burden was on
the employee to demonstrate an alternative only if the defendant
proved that his methods were required and justified by business necessity. 1 51 However, under Wards Cove, it is clear that an employer
does not have to prove anything. An employer may simply explain
the disparities by articulating some reasonable business
justification. 36
The impact of Wards Cove is even greater than most realize.
After viewing the new disparate impact model, it may be assumed
that the plaintiff will always be forced to show a less discriminatory
alternative in an effort to win the suit. 137 This is so because any reasonable employer will always be able to articulate at least one business purpose for the challenged practice. If a plaintiff can ever establish a prima facie case under the new statistical restrictions, then the
next procedural step will be a formality. The employee will inevitably be forced to demonstrate an alternative." 38 In light of the Court's
the disparate impact plaintiff rarely, if ever, succeeded in convincing a court that a proposed
alternative was enough to win. Id. at 2118. According to several scholars, no plaintiff has ever
won on these grounds. See Rothschild and Werden, Title VII and the Use of Employment
Tests: An Illustration of the Limits of the Judicial Process. I1 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 272-73
(1982) (noting that the issue of whether a less discriminatory alternative exists has rarely if
ever been reached in a testing case); Lamber, Alternative to Challenged Employee Selection
Criteria:The Significance of Nonstatistical Evidence in DisparateImpact Cases Under Title
VII, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1, 45 (1985) (indicating that there have been no cases reported where
plaintiff successfully demonstrated a less discriminatory alternative); Booth and MacLeary,
Legal Constraints on Employment Testing and Evolving Trends in the Law, 29 EmIORY L.J.
121, 190 (1980) (reporting that there have been no cases in which a plaintiff has demonstrated
acceptable alternatives to the use of a validated test).
134. 422 U.S. at 436.
135. See Alessandra, When Doctrines Collide: Disparate Treatment, DisparateImpact
and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1755, 1761 (1989). "Although
the precise contours of this [dispute impact] burden have been the subject of much debate, the
courts clearly place upon the employer the burden of proving, not merely explaining, that a
particularpractice is warrantedon the basis of business need." Id. This author does not disagree with Alessandra, but both this author and Alessandra have been "overturned" in this
interpretation by Wards Cove.
136. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26. Once again, this sounds strikingly similar to
the disparate treatment "legitimate business reason." See supra note 132.
137. See supra notes 121-36 and accompanying text.
138. Understood in light of the difficulty a plaintiff will have in establishing a significant
disparity, this ability of the employer to simply side-step his burden will push each plaintiff to
new limits. Of paramount concern to each plaintiff is the proof of a less discriminatory alternative, which may now be viewed as part of the plaintiff's prima facie case. See supra notes 12136 and accompanying text.
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admonition of supplanting judges' business sense for that of the employer, this is no minor hurdle. Indeed, with the plaintiff's case now
always relying on a low cost, highly efficient and less discriminatory
alternative, it is even more devastating when one realizes that
"[a]lthough the Albemarle Court articulated the 'less discriminatory
alternative' defense [sic] over thirteen years ago, a review of voluminous case law reveals that no plaintiff has ever successfully demonstrated a less discriminatoryalternativeto a challenged practice."' 9
Disparate impact cases under Wards Cove are very different
from those under Griggs and Albemarle. First, in an attempt to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff cannot rely on statistical evidence demonstrating a polarization and stratification of the employer's work force. 140 The statistical comparison must be between
the number of minorities in the at-issue jobs and the number of qualified minority applicants or the number of minorities within the qualified labor force in the relevant geographical area. 41
Second, the plaintiff must prove the new prima facie case by
specifically identifying and isolating an individual employment practice and proving that such practice
specifically caused the statistical
4
disparity in the work force.' 1
Finally, if this new burden is met, the plaintiff must prove that
each questioned procedure is not justified by some business need or
related reason. 43 Of course, the employer first must offer a business
justification for each challenged practice, but the employee always
retains the burden of proving that these justifications are not truly
related to business needs. 4 Alternatively, the plaintiff can propose
alternatives which could meet the same business needs without the
disparate impact, but the Supreme Court has cautioned the lower
courts against ordering businesses to adopt these alternatives. 45
While the disparate impact model may still exist after Wards
Cove, a plaintiff virtually must prove intent in order to win.146 If an
139. Note, Watson v. Forth Worth Bank and Trust: A Plurality'sProposalto Alter the
Evidentiary Burdens in Title VII DisparateImpact Cases, 67 N.C.L. REv. 725, 739 (1989)

(authored by W. Gregory Rhodes) (noting that this is true at least in reported cases, and
citing the only possible contrary example as Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 395 F.
Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (finding it inappropriate to use [the challenged] test since no
evidence of its validity had been presented)).
140. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2120.
141. 109 S. Ct. at 2121.
142. 109 S. Ct. at 2124-25.
143. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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employer only has to give a business reason for a statistical disparity,
the plaintiff is left with the unbearable burden of showing alternatives. 4" The plaintiff has a better chance, however, of demonstrating
through independent evidence, that the employer's justification was
not the true reason, which would belie discriminatory intent. 148
Wards Cove's analysis and language imply than an employer's justification in a disparate impact case may be found to be a pretext. 149
A plaintiff may have more success convincing a court that an employer's proffered explanation is "unworthy of credence"' 50 than convincing the court to accept a less discriminatory alternative.
Regardless of the Court's intent, the effects of the Wards Cove
opinion are already being felt in the circuit and district courts of the
federal judiciary.' 5 ' Even state courts are following the WVards Cove
precedent.52
IV.

EARLY REACTION FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS

Several circuit courts have already used Wards Cove to turn

back Title VII plaintiffs, many of whom failed to establish a prima
facie case under the new standard. 5 3

In Mallory v. Booth Refrigeration Supply Co.," 4 the Fourth
Circuit rejected a disparate impact claim brought by African-American employees of Booth Refrigeration's Richmond office.'" The employees alleged that Booth refused to promote African-American
employees in the Richmond office to supervisory positions.' The
employer noted that any disparity in the work force in Richmond
147. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
148. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
149. Id.
150. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
151. See infra notes 154-76 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. California Fair Employment and Hous.
Comm'n., 218 Cal. App. 3d 517, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Harris v.
District of Columbia Comm'n. on Human Rights, 562 A.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Zader v.
Illinois Human Rights Comm'n., 131 I11.
2d 172, 545 N.E.2d 694 (1989); Hy-Vee Food
Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n., 453 N.W.2d 512 (Iowa 1990); West Virginia Inst.
of Technology v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 383 S.E.2d 490 (W. Va. 1989);
Guyan Valley Hosp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 88 (W.Va. 1989).
153. See Mallory v. Booth Refrigeration Supply Co., 882 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1989);
Lowe v. Commack Union Free School Dist., 886 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir. 1989).
154. 882 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1989).
155. Id. This case involved two African-American employees who were passed up for a
supervisory position in favor of a white person with less seniority. Id. at 909-10. From the
facts, however, it was evident that the two plaintiffs were not model employees. Id. at 910. The
significance of this case is not who won or lost, but the Fourth Circuit's discussion of Wards
Cove. Id. at 912.
156. Id. at 909.
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should be negated by the fact that of a total of seven supervisory
positions, three were filled by African-Americans.157 The employer
further offered the employment records and history of the plaintiffs
as a justification for non-promotion. 58 The Mallory court used this
case to establish Wards Cove's effect on the law of the Fourth
Circuit.
The Mallory court noted that the plaintiffs proved that all five
clerical supervisory positions in the Richmond office were filled by
white employees, and that no African-American employee was ever
promoted to a supervisory position at the headquarters. 159 In an attempt to meet their prima facie burden, the plaintiffs offered statistics showing that the qualified labor pool for the job consisted of
clerical workers already employed, six of whom were
eighteen
60
black.1
The court noted that even if it did recognize the eighteen clerical workers as the relevant labor pool, the plaintiff failed to prove
how many were qualified.' 6 ' The court further rejected the plaintiff's
prima facie case, saying that plaintiffs were required to "identify the
specific employment practice that is allegedly responsible for the disparity and prove that the practice has caused exclusion of the group
of which the plaintiffs are members." 16 2 The court stated that the
plaintiff's identification of Booth's subjective criteria and "refusal to
consider length of service" was not enough to meet the Wards Cove
63
individual identification requirement.1
In Lowe v. Commack Union Free School District,6 the Second
Circuit fully discussed the new standard for disparate impact cases,
first noting that any disparity between classes of employees must be
"sufficiently substantial" in order to raise a question of discrimination.'6 5 The court gleaned from Wards Cove the negative view with
which the Supreme Court viewed statistics, 6 and articulated the
Id. at 911.
158. Id. at 910.
159. Id. at 912.
157.

160.

Id.

161. Id.
162. Id. This case is factually similar to Wards Cove in that the challenged hiring practices included subjective review of applications, and there were no written policies on promotions and the company did not post announcements about available positions. Id. at 909.
163. Id. at 912. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text discussing Mallory and
the burden of proof in the business justification context.
164. 886 F.2d 1364 (2 Cir. 1989).
165. Id. at 1370.
166. Id.
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new prima facie case for disparate impact. 617 Assuming that a sufficient disparity is shown, the plaintiff must then identify the specific
employment practice that has caused the disparity. 68 The Court
stated that "under Wards Cove and Watson, [the plaintiffs] cannot
satisfy the requirements of a prima facie case simply by broadly attacking as discriminatory the hiring process as a whole. .

.

. Thus,

the overall results of the process, without more, do not show disparate impact."' 16 9 With this, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim
that they were excluded from employment because of their age. 70
It is clear from the Second Circuit's opinion in EEOC v. Joint
Apprenticeship Committee' that the law in the circuit was radically changed by Wards Cove. In Joint Apprenticeship, the court
vacated a lower court's injunction against the hiring practice of the
committee. 172 The court noted the apparent discrepancy between the
case law of the Second Circuit and the law under Wards Cove. 73
The court pointed out that, although the Supreme Court insisted
that it was not "announcing new law but was merely clarifying the
existing standards, 7 4 the Wards Cove decision added a new element
to the prima facie requirement for disparate impact cases."" The
court cited the language of Wards Cove, which stated that a plaintiff
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1371.
170. Id. Although the Wards Cove standard was applied in this case, it is not clear
whether the disparate impact theory should be applied to age discrimination cases. Stacy, A
Case Against Extending the Adverse Impact Doctrine to ADEA, 10 ENIPL. REL. L.J. 431
(1984-85).
171. 895 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1990).
172. Id. The court described the Committee's hiring practice as follows: "JAC is a joint
labor-management board that administers training programs for apprentice electricians in the
New York City metropolitan area. Successful completion of such a program leads to eligibility
for membership in an electrician's union, Local 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers." Id. at 87.
"In administering the programs, JAC issued recruitment announcements in 1980, 1981,
and 1983." Id. "Each announcement stated that applicants would not be accepted in the program unless they, inter alia, (1) possessed a New York State-approved high school or general
equivalency diploma, and (2) were no more than 22 years of age if they had not served in the
armed forces, or no more than 26 if they were veterans." Id.
"Further, in the counties from which JAC received applications, 89.2 percent of whites
between the ages of 19 and 22 had high school degrees, whereas only 68.3 percent of blacks in
the same age group had such degrees." Id. "A higher percentage of black applicants (ranging
from 3.42 to 6.23 percent) than of white applicants (ranging from 1.79 to 2.13 percent) lacked
the mandated high school credentials. EEOC concluded that 'the use of the criterion of a high
school degree will have an adverse impact on blacks.
Id. at 88.
173. Id. at 91.
174. Id. at 90 (citing Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124).
175. Id.
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"does not make out a case of disparate impact simply76 by showing
1
that . . . there is racial imbalance in the work force.
The Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had placed
new emphasis on causation, stating that,
[I]n the present case, as clarified by Wards Cove, EEOC bore the
initial burden of demonstrating not only race and gender disparities
but also a causal nexus between those disparities and JAC's diploma and maximum age requirements. It is not at all clear, however, that the district court made its summary judgment decision
within this framework, for it appears that the court thought it unnecessary to determine whether the statistical disparities were
caused by the challenged criteria."'
The Eleventh Circuit is more forthright about the effects of
Wards Cove. In Hill v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co.,' 78 the
Eleventh Circuit held that Wards Cove "overruled the existing law
in this circuit on this issue.' 79 In Hill, the court rejected the claims
of five African-American employees who claimed to have suffered
from employment policies which caused a disparate impact on them
because of their race. 0° The plaintiffs offered statistical proof that
12 % of the carmen, as opposed to only 4% of the foremen, were
black.'"' The plaintiffs alleged that the employer failed to promote
black carmen to foremen.' 82 The court outlined the new prima facie
case as follows:
The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the defendant
employed a facially neutral employment practice that had a significant discriminatory effect on blacks and that it is the application of
that specific employment practice that has caused the disparity.
The defendant may rebut the charge by "articulating a nondiscriminatory business justification"' 83 for the employment practice,
in response to which the plaintiff may demonstrate that the proffered employment justification was insubstantial or pretextual or
may demonstrate pretext by showing another device that would
176. Id. (quoting Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124).
is not
177. Id. at 91. The court quoted the district court decision as stating that "[i]t
necessary for plaintiffs to explain the disparity on which their prima facie rests; they must only
show that its existence is more probable than not." Id.
178. 885 F.2d 804 (1lth Cir. 1989).
179. Id. at 812 n.12 (referring to the transfer, from the defendant to the plaintiff, of the
burden of proof on the business justification issue).
180. Id. at 805-06.
181. Id. at 812.
182. Id. at 805-06. The plaintiffs also offered evidence that white carmen were being
promoted to foremen. Id. at 806.
183. Id. at 811-12 (emphasis added).
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4

The court further cited a reversal of the burdens assigned to the
parties:
After the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the employer
may rebut the inference of discrimination by articulating a nondiscriminatory business justification. .

.

. At this stage, the employer

has the burden of producing evidence of the business justification.
The ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff. . .. 1
The Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove made it clear that the
employer merely has the burden of production at this stage, and
overruled the existing law in the circuit on this issue. 8 " At the time
of the trial in this case, March 1983, the law in this circuit required
the defendant, not the plaintiff,to identify the various practices re87
sulting in the promotion decisions."
Despite the differences in burdens, the court did not remand for
further finding because the court rejected the plaintiff's intra-workforce comparisons. 188
In two recent cases, the Seventh Circuit addressed all aspects of
Wards Cove. In Allen v. Seidman, 89 a black bank examiner brought
a class action suit against the FDIC, alleging a disparate impact on
hiring and promotions based on a "program evaluation" test used in
determining promotion choices. 190 The plaintiff demonstrated that
39 % of black candidates passed the test, white 84% of white candidates passed the test."9 ' The Seventh Circuit ruled that this met the
plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case showing of disparate impact, but vacated and remanded the lower court's decision
because the district court applied the business necessity defense.'"2
The Seventh Circuit focused first on the proper pool for a statistical study.' 9 ' The court allowed the plaintiffs to utilize a comparison
of the currently employed work force, distinguishing this comparison
184. Id. The last step openly equates the disparate impact doctrine of "pretext" with
that of disparate treatment. Id. at 812.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 812 n.12.
187. Id. at 813 n.16 (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 812. The court applied Wards Cove and rejected a comparison between carmen and foremen indicating disparity. Id. This was the same comparison rejected by Wards
Cove. See 109 S. Ct. at 2121-22.
189. 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989).
190. Id. at 381.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 381.
193. Id. at 378.
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from the one rejected in Wards Cove."'
[T]he problem of comparability is much less acute here than in
Wards Cove. ...

[T]here is reason to believe that the pool taking

the test will be reasonably homogenous despite possible differences
(not, by the way, proved in this case) in original entry qualifications, and this makes the very large disparity between blacks and
whites in performance on the test suggestive of racial bias. 95
Additionally, the defendants in Allen attacked the plaintiff's
statistics on grounds other than the relevant pool. 9 6 The FDIC alleged that the plaintiff's analysis of the results of the test focused

only on blacks and whites. 97 The FDIC argued that Title VII plaintiffs must proffer a "multiple regression analysis" which may find
other causes of the disparity besides race, such as education or experience.198 The defendants insisted that a simple black and white
analysis could not meet the statistical prima facie showing demanded

by Wards Cove.' 99 The Court's response to and application of Wards
Cove may prove unsettling to supporters of Wards Cove.2 00
Paradoxically, our conclusion is strengthened by Wards Cove, because after that decision the prima facie case means less than it did
before, so there is less reason to be fussy about it. Under the regime of Wards Corv it just makes the defendant produce some evidence in justification of its test, after which the plaintiff must prove
the test unreasonable. In addition, the defendant can always present evidence to show that there is no disparate impact - that is
merely an artifact of the plaintiff's statistical study.20 1

The FDIC also alleged that since the plaintiffs did not specifi194. Id. at 379-80. The Court in Wards Cove was adamant about not accepting a comparison between employee "tracks" of same firm. 109 S. Ct. at 2121-22. The relevant labor
pool accepted by Wards Cove consisted of the qualified potential employees from the relevant
geographical area. Id. at 2121. The court insisted on a comparison of the number of the minorities in the relevant labor pool and the number of minorities in the questioned positions. Id.
Often times a court will accept actual applicants or "applicant flow data" as the relevant labor
pool. Id. The Court also insisted that any disparities in the number of minorities hired must be
significantly substantial. Id. at 2122-23.
195. Allen, 881 F.2d at 379.
196. Id. at 378.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 379. Judge Posner's analysis of Wards Cove is accurate, yet his application
of Wards Cove may frustrate the intent of the Supreme Court.
201. Id. (citations omitted). The court was not clear as to how a plaintiff might "prove"
a test to be unreasonable. It can be assumed that the court viewed a less discriminatory alternative as proof that the employees' test was unreasonable.
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cally pinpoint what was wrong with the testing, the case should have
been dismissed.2"2 The defendants insisted that Wards Cove required
the plaintiffs to pinpoint particular aspects of the testing that were
unfavorable to blacks.2"' The court did not agree.
[N]othing in the structure of a disparate-impact case requires such
a pinpointing; whether the reason for the test's disparate impact
can be identified is merely another issue bearing on the correct interpretation of the plaintiffs' statistics. . . . In a test notably devoid of objective standards . . . the danger is acute that racial bias

of which the testers may well be unconscious will influence the
grade.20 4

The Seventh Circuit therefore held that the identification of the
one test was particular enough to establish a prima facie case. 205 In
the Seventh Circuit, a plaintiff does not have to identify which individual aspects of the test cause the disparity. 206 This is a reasonable
interpretation of Wards Cove. In Wards Cove, the plaintiff brought
before the court several different techniques, standards and selection
devices which, it alleged, as a whole, caused a disparate impact.20 7
The Court's demand for specificity was focused on which selection
devices caused a disparity.208 It did not call for a dissection of every
device to determine the fatal flaw of each. 00 While this may be of
comfort to some critics, it must be remembered that it is often difficult to determine which device actually determines the disparity. In
addition, this is the law of only one circuit. The Seventh Circuit may
insist, when faced with multiple selection devices, that the plaintiff
202. Id. at 381. The Wards Cove decision and the decisions of the circuit courts that
have examined Wards Cove seem to insist on specificity in the employees' allegation. See
supra notes 200-34 and accompanying text (discussing the specificity of the allegation). The
Seventh Circuit attempted half-heartedly to pinpoint one specific allegation by the plaintiff.
Allen, 881 F.2d at 381. The Allen court suggested that the plaintiffs alleged that the lack of
objective testers and the vast use of subjective tests was a specific allegation. Id. However, this
was the same argument that was rejected by Wards Cove. 109 S. Ct. at 2125. The Allen court
did note that the plaintiff in this case was attacking one test and not a series of test or devices.
Allen, 881 F.2d at 381. The plaintiff was simply pointing out several problems with the one
test. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff could not be held to show causation for each
critical aspect of a single test. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. Unfortunately, this interpretation may be a case of a court seeing a worthy
plaintiff and applying the rules favorably to that plaintiff.
205. Id. at 378-79.
206. Id. at 381.
207. 109 S. Ct. at 2115.
208. Id. at 2114.
209. Id.
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pinpoint which device caused the impact.2 10 Finally, in light of
Wards Cove, the Allen court renamed the "business necessity defense" the "issue of legitimate employer purpose."211

In the companion case of Evans v. City of Evanston,212 the
court once again addressed the state of statistics in the Seventh Circuit. 1 3 Evans was a class action brought on behalf of women applicants who failed the physical agility test for city fire fighting positions.2 The circuit court rejected the lower court's finding that the
city did not justify its test.21 5 The court held that the district court
placed the "burden of persuasion on the wrong party, thus requiring
a remand. ' 21 6 The court focused on the lower court's use of the term
"justify" when deciding that the test "was not justified by
Evanston. 21 7
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the lower court judge that the
city fell far short of justifying the use of the test. 1 8 However, under
Wards Cove the city did not have to justify the test, but had only to
give a business-related reason for it.2 9 The city did this by demonstrating that fire fighters need to be fit, quick and strong.220 The city
did not even attempt to justify its cut-off point for a passing grade.22 '
In fact, "[s]o feeble was the city's effort to justify the cut-off point
for the physical agility test that it can be argued that the city did not
even carry its burden of production. '222 The circuit court did not feel
this was sufficient.2 3 It focused instead on the language used by the
lower court in asking the city to justify the test. 2 4 The circuit court
210. The court in Allen presented a reasonable interpretation of Wards Cove. See supra
notes 189-211 and accompanying text. However, the Supreme Court may not view Allen as
reasonable. While Allen articulated the rules of Wards Cove, it specifically excluded from the
burdens of Wards Cove any plaintiffs who attack a single test but who cannot explain what
specifically is wrong with it. See supra notes 202-09 and accompanying text. This may be
contrary to the Court's new stringent causation requirement. Id.
211. 881 F.2d at 380.
212. 881 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1989).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 383.
215. Id. at 385.
216. Id. at 382.
217. Id. at 385.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 384. This explanation would probably not have satisfied the business necessity and validation requirements that existed before Wards Cove.
221. Id. at 385.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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thereafter remanded for further hearings.225
Even with the lower burden of production required by Wards
Cove, the term "justify", as used by the lower court, can be viewed
to mean burden of production in connection with the business justification defense.226 If viewed as a burden of production, the city
should still fail for the reason indicated above.227 However, the court
called the defendant's burden not a defense but an "issue of legitimate employer purpose. "228
It is important to mention that Mallory also addresses the shifting of burdens.2 29 The Fourth Circuit noted that, even if the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case under the new standard, they
could not have prevailed.2 30 The Fourth Circuit very clearly delineated the burdens for the parties, stating that under Wards Cove, if a
prima facie case was established then the plaintiffs must "prove that
the proffered justificationfor the practice does not serve any legitimate employment goals of the employer. '231 Implicit in the court's
language is the assumption that an employer will always manage to
proffer some business reason. The court simply went from the prima
facie burden of the plaintiff to the additional burden of disproving
every business reason offered by the employer. In the Fourth Circuit,
this step has essentially become part of the prima facie case for any
plaintiff intending to proceed under a disparate impact claim.
In an opinion which touches on Wards Cove, the Third Circuit
acknowledges the shifting of burdens. In Williams v. Giant Eagle
Markets, 232 the court stated that the burden of persuasion remains
with the plaintiff at all times.2 33 There are too many district court
cases and state court cases which have already applied the Wards
Cove standard to list here, but it is fair to say that the new prima
facie requirements adopted by the Fourth Circuit have been widely
225. Id. at 386.
226. Id. at 385.
227. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
228. Evans, 881 F.2d at 383.
229. 882 F.2d at 911-12.
230. Id.
231. Id. (emphasis added). The court is very specific about the burden of proof, and has
also reduced the Griggs business necessity to a "legitimate employment goal." Id. The Fourth
Circuit interprets Wards Cove to require that the plaintiffs prove the negative, namely, that no
legitimate employment goal was the basis for the discrimination. The court's language is also
important because it did not even consider the possibility that a company would not proffer
some business reason. Id. The court realized that most rational employers will always be able
to offer some employment goal. Id.
232. 883 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1989).
233. Id. at 1190.
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followed by the lower courts.2 3 4
V.

A.

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

Fair Employment Reinstatement Act

The effects of Wards Cove on Title VII litigation were felt immediately, and were followed by Congressional criticism.2 35 A few
senators were in favor of the opinion, but the vast majority of those
who spoke criticized it as rejecting the intent and spirit of Title

VII.236 Three bills were specifically drafted and introduced to reverse
the effects of Wards Cove 237

234. See, e.g., Birdwhistle v. Kansas Power and Light, 723 F. Supp. 570 (Kan. 1989)
(discussing new business justification standard); Crader v. Concordia College, 724 F. Supp.
588 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (rejecting the use of statistics showing racial stratification of a work
force); Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section I Holding Corp., 724 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y 1989)
(getting around Wards Cove); Gregory v. Illinois, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 652
(1989) (containing a brief discussion of the use of statistics and the prima facie case); Gilty v.
Village of Oak Park, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1388 (1989) (rejecting prima facie case
because plaintiffs faulted the entire promotional process).
235. See generally, 135 CONG. REC. S7512 (statements of Senators Adamo, Hatfield,
Jeffords, Kennedy and Metzenbaum); 135 CONG. REc. E2378 (statements of Hon. William
(Bill) Clay); 135 CONG. REc. E2341 (1989) (statement of Hon. Augustus Hawkins); 135
CONG. REc. H4359 (1989) (statement of Hon. Mr. Flake); 135 CONG. REc. E2924 (1989)
(statement of Hon. Tom Cawbell).
236. 135 CONG. REC. S10, 219 (1989). Senator Orrin Hatch rose in favor of the decision. Id. In his speech, Senator Hatch addressed both the failed appointment of William Lucas
to a civil rights post as well as several of the Court's civil rights decisions. Id. In addressing
Wards Cove, Sen. Hatch relied on an article by former Judge Robert Bork, stating that "this
case retains the controversial disparate impact theory but makes some effort to ensure that it is
as reasonably applied as possible. It also attempts to avoid imposing racial or gender propositionality on American employers through the misuse of statistics and the misallocation of the
burden of proof." Id. at SI0, 220.
237. The first two bills, the Fair Employment Reinstatement Act (see infra notes 238-63
and accompanying text) and the Civil Rights Act of 1990 (see infra notes 264-73 and accompanying text) are discussed in detail. The third bill, the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1989
(H.R. Res. 2598, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. E2924 (1989), was reintroduced by
Congressman Tom Campbell specifically to "reverse portions of the Supreme Court's decision
in Wards Cove versus Atonio." Id. Rep. Campbell said he believes that "new [Wards Cove]
regime unfairly burdens the victims of discrimination. . . [and that the bill] would restore
disparate impact cases to their previous conditions." Id.
A compromise combination of these bills was introduced (S. 2104/44000) and passed by
Congress. This measure awaits the signature of the President. The bills' detractors claim that
it would cause quotas, however the same was said about the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Griggs. It should be noted that both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Griggs require, first and,
foremost, that selection of employers be done, according to ability, not because of a protected
classification. This rule continues today and any fear of "quotas" is unfounded, particularly in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in City of Richmond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
and Martin v. Wills, 109 S. Ct. 2080 (1989).
The addition of punitive damages and jury trials into the Civil Rights arsenal is an issue
which cannot be dealt within this article. They both, however, do raise concerns that the remedial nature of the Acts is in jeopardy. Punitive damages should be awarded only in the most
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The first bill introduced in response to Wards Cove was the Fair
Employment Reinstatement Act ("FERA").2 38 In introducing this
bipartisan measure, Senator Metzenbaum noted that the FERA was
in direct response to Wards Cove.239 The Senate record introduces
the bill as "[a] bill to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to clarify
the burden of proof for unlawful employment practices in disparate
impact cases. ..
240
The Senator pointed to Wards Cove as a "stunning example of
the Court's retreat from equal opportunity. ' 24 1 He stated that Wards
Cove undermined Title VII, primarily by impairing a plaintiff's ability to prevail in disparate impact cases. 42 Senator Metzenbaum focused primarily on the alteration of burdens.
By shifting this burden to the plaintiff, the Court has made it far
more difficult for plaintiffs to secure relief in cases where employment practices have widespread discriminatory consequences. How
can we expect a plaintiff-an individual employee or job applicant-to be able to prove there is no business justification for a
particular practice? It is the employer, not the individual worker,
who knows why the practice was adopted. In addition, anyone who
has ever been in a courtroom knows that it is virtually impossible
for a party to prove the negative.2 43
The Senator further scolded the Court for its insistence that an
employee be forced to prove that each individual practice caused the
disparate impact, stating that this added burden was too much for a
plaintiff to bear. 244 "[A]s a practical matter, an employee selection
process often invokes multiple practices-such as tests, interviews
and education requirements-that are interrelated. 2 4 5 According to
the Senator, "[p]laintiffs who prove that the process as a whole [has
a disparate impact] should not also have to isolate factor and assess
its contribution, particularly because employers have far readier access to the pertinent information. 2 4 6
graphic examples and probably only when connected with the disparate treatment intent-based
model. Juries open the doors to local prejudice and in this time of growing racial strife (major-

ity backlash), a jury may not be the best place for such sensitive and complicated issues and
public policies.
238. S. Res. 1261, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135
239. Id.
240. Id.

241.

CONG.

Rac. S7512 (1989).

Id. at S7513.

242. Id.
243. Id. (emphasis added).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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The Fair Employment Reinstatement Act overturns the Wards
Cove decision. . . . In particular, the bill reestablishes that: first,
when a plaintiff demonstrates disparate impact . . . it is the em-

ployer's burden to prove the affirmative defense of business necessity; and second, a plaintiff may challenge a group of employment
specific practice
practices without having to demonstrate that each
247
within the group resulted in disparate impact.
by
FERA also makes it clear that business necessity is only satisfied 24
8
proving that the practice is essential to effective job performance.
Congressman Flake, while introducing the same bill into the House
247. Id.
248. Id. (emphasis added). The text of the bill is as follows:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the Fair Employment Reinstatement Act.
SEC. 2. PROOF OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN DISPARATE IMPACT CASES.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
(1) IN GENERAL.-In an action or proceeding under this title, an unlawful employment practice is established when(k)_ PROOF OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN DISPARATE IMPACT
CASES. (A) a complaining party demonstrates that an employment practice results in a
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity,
or
(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employment practices
results in a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, and the respondent fails to demonstrate that such practices are required by
business necessity: Provided, That (i) if the complaining party demonstrates that a group of employment practices
results in a disparate impact, such party shall not be required to demonstrate which
specific practice or practices within the group resulted in such disparate impact; and
(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice within
the group of employment practices does not contribute to the disparate impact, the
respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by
business necessity.
(2) DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this subsection (A) the term 'complaining party' means a person who may bring an action or
proceeding under this title:
(B) the term 'respondent' means an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee;
(C) the term 'demonstrates' means meets the burden of production and
persuasion;
(D) the term 'required by business necessity' means essential to effective job
performance; and
(E) the term 'group of employment practices: [sic] means a combination of
employment practices or an overall employment process.
Id. See also id. at 7514 (summarizing the FERA). For a summary of the FERA see 135
CONG. REC. S 7512-13.
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of Representatives, stated that the bill was in direct response to the
Wards Cove decision and noted that it would "restore the Griggs
rule to the civil rights arsenal. 12 49
In an address entitled Wards Cove Packing Co. versus
Antonio-Statistics Speak, But the Court No Longer Listens, 50
Congressman William Clay assailed the Court for its Wards Cove
decision.2 51 Specifically referring to the Court's rejection of statistical proof of the stratification of a work force, Congressman Clay
cited the Court's acceptance of a broad geographic area as the relevant population as excessive and improper. 2 The relevant
population
was not limited to those persons in the union who had sojourned to
Alaska year after year on cannery line jobs, and/or to those in the
native village who habitually worked on cannery line jobs. The trial
court . . . included the general population of all those living in
Alaska, the Pacific Northwest and California . . . and the Su-

preme Court did not disagree.25

Congressman Clay expressed a fear that, since the Court did not
reject this comparison, "job stratification on race, color, sex, religion
or national origin might well go unchecked. 254 In the case of Dowdy
v. Municipality of Monroeville,255 Congressman Clay's fears were
realized. In Dowdy, the district court granted summary judgment
to
the employer because the plaintiff's statistical data only considered
the disparate impact and disparity within the work force. 25 1 The municipality of Monroeville had an ordinance which mandated that
nonresident employees be furloughed before any Monroeville residents.25 7 Although there was a mix of white and black resident employees, all the nonresident employees were black, thus all those fur249. 135 CONG. REC. H4359 (daily ed. July 27, 1989) (statement
of Mr. Flake).
250. 135 CONG. REc. H2378 (daily ed. June 29, 1989) (statement
of Rep. Clay) [hereinafter Statistics Speak].
251. Id.
252. Id. at H2379.
253. Id.
254. Id. The Supreme Court in Wards Cove instructed the
trial court to determine the

relevant labor market and only allow a comparison between that and
the at-issue jobs with
respect
to the plaintiff's prima facie case. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct.
at 2121-22.
255. Fair. Empl. Prac. Case. (BNA) 557 (W.D. Pa. 1989).

256. Id. at 557-58. The court properly applied Wards Cove and rejected
the infra work
force comparison. Id. at 558. At the same time, the court denied
what a casual glance revealed: that
a facially neutral statute would eliminate seven blacks out of
fourteen before one
white would even be considered for a furlough. Id. at 557.
257. Id.
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loughed were black.258 The court declared the ordinance facially
neutral and rejected the plaintiffs statistical proof of
discrimination.259
The court cited Wards Cove to support its conclusion that a reduction of blacks in the work force from 71.4% to 63.6% was not
enough, especially when blacks made up only 4% of the municipality's residents.2 6 The Dowdy court applied the Wards Cove view of
the relevant labor market as follows:
The parties do not stipulate to the composition of the work force in
Monroeville's labor market area, but we can take judicial notice
that the PittsburghMetropolitan area is racially and ethnically di-

verse. When one considers that the relevant comparison in Title
VII disparate impact matters is between the composition of the
general labor market and the composition of the work force in the
jobs at issue . . . one can see that no prima facie Title VII claim
could be made by plaintiffs unless the general labor market in the
Monroeville area is well in excess1 of 63.6% black. This plaintiffs
26
do not allege and cannot prove.

The opinion in Dowdy refers to the ethnic and racial diversity of
metropolitan Pittsburgh and states that the comparison should be
made between the work force composition and the general labor
market in the Monroeville (which the court defined as the Pittsburgh
metropolitan area).262 Prior to Wards Cove, the Hazelwood Court

rejected a similar comparison between suburban St. Louis and the
St. Louis metropolitan area. 6 a In Dowdy, if the court rejected the
Pittsburgh metropolitan area as the relevant labor pool and relied
instead upon those members of the labor pool who have shown interest (such as current employees), then it would appear that the statistics would have been found to be discriminatory.
B.

The Civil Rights Act of 1990

In introducing the Civil Rights Act of

1990,264

Senator Ken-

258. Id.
259. Id. at 557-58.
260. Id. at 557. Rep. Clay expressed concern about the use of too wide a population
comparison, as allowed in Wards Cove but rejected by Hazelwood. Statistics Speak, supra
note 250, at H2378-79. By taking judicial notice of the makeup of the population of Pitts-

burgh, the Dowdy court made just such a comparison. 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
558.
261.
262.

Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Id.

263. 433 U.S. at 310-13.
264.

S. Res. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Cong., 136

CONG.
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nedy openly declared that it is intended to overturn "a series of [Supreme Court] rulings that mark an abrupt and unfortunate departure from its historic vigilance in protecting civil rights."' 6" Senator
Kennedy went on to say that the bill would restore and strengthen
the basis laws that prohibit racism and other types of bias in our
society. 266 This particular piece of legislation seeks to overturn many
of the Courts' recent decisions regarding civil rights in actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII, among others.26 7
Senator Kennedy explained that the bill's attack on Wards Cove
was focused on its elimination of the employer's burden of proving
business necessity.268 The Civil Rights Act of 1990 "restores the
Griggs rule by providing that, once a person proves that an employment practice has a disparate impact, the employer must justify the
practice by showing that it is based on business necessity." 269
The supporters of this bill moved to quell the concern of those
who insisted that this bill and the others would require strict racial
quotas as the only way to avoid a suit. 270 None of the bills proposed
in response to Wards Cove requires proportional population representation.2 7' The Griggs opinion itself directly states that quotas will
not carry the day and that only employment practices based on qualifications are legitimate. 2 In fact, the proposed bills do not outlaw
even the largest disparities in the work force if the disparity is
caused by a practice which is essential to the business. In other
words, the proposals simply seek to re-establish the last 20 years of
disparate impact rules and procedures. Senator Kennedy maintained:
We have already heard it stated on the floor of the Senate that [the
1990).
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at S1018 (referring to the Wards Cove decision, among others.)
Id.
Id. at S1021.
Id.
Id.

For eighteen years following Chief Justice Warren Burger's unanimous opinion for
the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.

424 (1971), Title VII had placed on employers the burden of showing that employ-

ment practices with a disparate impact.

. . are

required by business necessity. Last

year in Wards Cove . . . the court effectively overruled this Griggs rule and held
that, no matter how strong the proof of discriminatory effect, the employer need no

longer prove that its practices are required by business necessity. Instead, victims of
discrimination must bear the heavy burden of proving that the employer has no
legal justification for its exclusionary practices.
Id.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at S1022 (statement of Sen. Jeffords).
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
401 U.S. at 436.
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legitimization of quotas] will be the inevitable result of that section
which deals with the Court's decision in Wards Cove. . . . How-

ever, this assessment is incorrect, for the act specifically makes
clear that it does not affect or change the law governing affirmative
action and does not mandate quotas in any fashion. All that is intended by the framers of this provision and we believe, all that is
accomplished therein is the restoration of the Griggs .

.

. rule that

once a plaintiff has proven an employment practice produces a disparate impact on the basis of sex, race or other protected category,

the burden shifts to the employer to justify the practice on the basis of business necessity." 3
VI.

WARDS COVE ESSENTIALLY OVERRULES GRIGGS

As certain members of Congress have pointed out, there are several inconsistencies between the Court's denial that it was establish-

ing new law and the practical effects of Wards Cove. The unanimous
Griggs Court has in effect been overridden by the five member majority joining in the Wards Cove opinion.27" The idea behind Griggs
was that:
the objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of em273. 136 CONG. REC. at S1022 (statement of Sen. Jeffords) pertaining to disparate im- "
pact as follows:

(k)

PROOF OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE IN DISPARATE IMPACT

CASES. -

(1) An unlawful employment practice is established under his subsection
when(A) a complaining party demonstrates that an employment practice results in a
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity;
or
(b) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employment practices
results in a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, and the respondent fails to demonstrate that such practices are required by
business necessity, except that (i) if a complaining party demonstrates that a group of employment practices
results in a disparate impact, such party shall not be required to demonstrate which
specific practice or practices within the group results in such disparate impact; and
(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment piactice within
such group of employment practices does not contribute to the disparate impact, the
respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by
business necessity.
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity
may be used as a defense only against a claim under this subsection.
Id. at S1019.
274. 109 S. Ct. at 2118 (joining in the opinion of Justice White were Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy).
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ployment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.275
The Griggs Court relied on the Equal Employment Opportunities Act, (Civil Rights Act of 1964) which states in pertinent part
that "it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
. . . to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. '"278
The Court in Griggs referred to legislative history when it insisted that Congress was concerned with the consequences of employment decisions, not necessarily the motivation of those decisions .17 They held that good intentions did not redeem practices
which hinder a protected class in pursuit of employment opportunity." 8 Wards Cove rejects this rationale, as it places on the plaintiff
the unbearable burden of disproving all reasonably offered justifications for the employer's discriminatory practice. 27 9 Griggs clearly
called for the employer to demonstrate that the challenged practices
measured "the person for the job and not the person in
the
abstract." 8 0
In fact, Griggs makes it clear that testing procedures and practices which measure qualifications are what Title VII demands.28
'
Therefore, even if a procedure has a disparate impact, if it is shown
275. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
276. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1972).
277. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
278. Id.
279. Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2126.
280. Griggs,401 U.S. at 436. The Court further stated that "[nlothing
in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures; obviously they are useful.
What Congress
has forbidden is giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless
they are
strably a reasonable measure of job performance." Id. "Congress has not commanded demonthat the
less qualified be preferred over the better qualified simply because of minority
origins. Far
from disparagingjob qualificationsas such, Congress has made such qualifications
the controllingfactor, so that race, religion, nationality and sex become irrelevant."
Id. (emphasis
added). Griggs makes it clear that quotas are not the answer. Id. In fact,
quota system may be a violation of Title VII. Id. The Griggs rule demands under Griggs, a
that job qualifications are what is being measured and not protected classifications. Id.
281. Id.
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to be an accurate measurement of quality which is necessary to job
performance, then that procedure is valid.2 82 Wards Cove, however,
rejects Griggs and its interpretation of Title VII, by allowing the
employer to offer a legitimate goal to which the practice is tied as an
excuse for any resulting disparities." 3
Wards Cove does not state that an employer has to demonstrate
that the challenged practices actually measure a person's ability to
do the job. All Wards Cove asks is that an employer articulate a
28 4 This
business reason for the implementation of the practice.
charge is clearly at odds with Griggs and all of it progeny.
Before Wards Cove, the Supreme Court, the federal courts and
federal agencies have all consistently enforced Griggs, requiring an
employer to defend its practice by demonstrating business necessity
as well as a reliable connection between the practice and the ability
to perform the job. 285 The majority in Wards Cove casually denies
this heritage by stating that the burdens described in earlier cases,
even the words "burden of proof," should be understood to mean a
burden of production, not persuasion. 28 6 At the same time, the
Wards Cove majority says that there is no requirement that the
challenged practice be essential.287 In his dissent, Justice Stevens
criticized the court for its handling of these issues, stating that he
was "astonished to read that . . . 'there is no requirement that the
challenged practice be . . essential'. "288

Justice Stevens stated that, even if he didn't feel that the Griggs
standard reflected the intent of Congress, he could not join the majority because its view rejected a consistent interpretation of a federal statute which could have been corrected by Congress had the
prior interpretation been found to be mistaken.289 While Congress
282. Id.
283. Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2125-26.
284.

Id.

285. See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 2124.
287. Id. A long line of cases demonstrates that Griggs stood for the proposition that the
employer had the burden of proof to demonstrate that the challenged practice was necessary
or essential. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979)
(holding that the employer "rebutted" the plaintiff's prima facie case by demonstrating that its
narcotics rule is job related); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (holding that
an employer has to prove that the challenged requirements are job related); Albermarle Paper
Co. v. Moody 422 U.S. 408, 425 (1975) (holding that an employer has the burden of proving
that its test is job related); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (holding that an employer has the burden
of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment).
288. Id. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion).
289. See id.
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had not reacted to the consistent interpretation of Griggs during its
twenty year tenure, within a week of the Wards Cove decision several pieces of legislation were introduced with the intent of restoring
Griggs.90
It is important to note the practical significance of Wards Cove.
First, the decision severely limits statistical comparisons, and rejects
intra work force comparisons, even if a company has 100% white
managers and 100% non-white laborers. 29' This rejection "underestimates the probative value of a racially stratified work force." 292
Wards Cove says that this type of comparison would force an employer to engage in the "expensive and time consuming task of defending the 'business necessity' of the methods used to select the
other members of his work force." 29 As Congressman Clay put it,
"that's what the law is all about. Chief Justice Burger said so in the
Duke Power Co. decision back in 1987, and hundreds of courts have
repeated this refrain ever since. ' 294 Justice Stevens also argued that
by allowing a comparison between the stratified work force, the
Court would gain a more accurate picture of those persons qualified
and available.295
An undisputed requirement for employment

. .

. [in this case] is

availability for seasonal employment in the far reaches of Alaska.
[There is no way of knowing what] portion of the general popula-

tion in Alaska, California, and the Pacific Northwest . ..would
accept this type of employment. . . .[C]omparing racial composi-

tions within the work force identifies a pool of workers willing to
work during the relevant times and familiar with the workings of
the industry. .

.

.Surely this is more probative than the untailored

general population statistics on which petitioners focus.2"'

The second disadvantage to the plaintiffs due to Wards Cove is
the apparent need to read the mind of the employer and anticipate
every reasoned goal to which the challenged practice can be tied. 297
Besides the fact that this is a rejection of long standing precedent, 2 8
it places a heavy burden upon the plaintiffs. The court recognized
290. See supra notes 237-73 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 235-73 and accompanying text.
292. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127. This view rejects the "common sense" value of
such a showing.
293. Id. at 2122.
294. Statistics Speak, supra note 250, at E2379.
295. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2134-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
296. Wards Cove, 570 U.S.L.W. at 4590.
297. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
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this but insisted that liberal discovery rules and federal regulation
requiring statistics be kept on minority employment would lessen the
load.299 Practically speaking, this is not so. The plaintiff must somehow prove that the challenged practice is not tied to any business
goal and then prove exactly how it causes the disparity 300 If there is
more than one component in the process, Wards Cove requires that
the plaintiff fully demonstrate how much of the disparity was caused
by each component.301 No doubt this will have a chilling effect on all
disparate impact plaintiffs, especially those challenging subjective
criteria. The plaintiff in a "subjective" case has the impossible task
of demonstrating what it is about the employer that causes him to
hire more whites than non-whites.30 2 Even if a plaintiff could make a
prima facie showing of disparate impact, the employer need only articulate some reasonable business explanation. 03 This is perhaps the
greatest effect of Wards Cove, as it forces all disparate impact plaintiffs to show a less discriminatory alternative. 04 As noted earlier,
this has never been done. 05
The practical effects of Wards Cove are best illustrated by
EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee,30 6 a recent circuit court
case in which the plaintiff challenged the employer's requirement
that applicants have a high school diploma for admission into a
training program.30 7 The plaintiffs demonstrated that this test for
admission had a disparate impact on blacks because 89.2% of the
whereas only
eligible white applicants had high school degrees
308
degrees.
school
high
had
68.3% of eligible blacks
Furthermore, the plaintiffs demonstrated that only 16% of the
black applicants were accepted, as opposed to the white applicant
acceptance ratio of 44 %.110 Invoking Wards Cove, the circuit court
stated that the statistics did not necessarily show a causal link be299. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
301. Id. Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that this was an unwarranted requirement,
stating that "[p]roof of numerous questionable employment practices ought to fortify an employee's assertion that the practices caused racial disparities." Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at
2125.
302. Id. at 2129-30.
303. Id. at 2130.
304. Id. at 2125.
305. See supra note 28.
306. See 895 F.2d 86.

307. Id. at 87.
308.

Id. at 88.

309.

Id.
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tween the diploma requirement and the disparity. 10
The Joint Apprenticeship case is strikingly similar to Griggs.311
In Griggs, one of the challenged practices was a high school diploma
requirement. 312 In Griggs, the plaintiffs alleged that while 39% of
white males had a high school diploma, only 12% of black males
did. s13 The plaintiff then showed that of 95 employees, only 14 were
black.314 The Court in Griggs did not ask the plaintiffs to prove the
direct and actual causal relationship between the diploma requirement and the disparity, but looked at the record for evidence that
the diploma requirement had a "demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used. ' 31 The
Griggs court rejected the employer's argument that the requirement
had a manifest relationship to the employer's desire to improve quality. 316 Although the Court noted that the employer's efforts to help
finance its undereducated employees' attempts to earn diplomas indicated a lack of discriminatory intent, it nevertheless found that Title
VII was directed at the consequences of the practices, not the motivation behind them. 17 The Court decided for the plaintiffs under the
new theory of disparate impact.31 8
From the court's discussion in Joint Apprenticeship Committee,
it seems likely that the Griggs plaintiffs would fail under Wards
Cove for the lack of a specific causal connection between the diploma requirement and the disparity. Wards Cove may also signal
the acceptance of Duke Power's argument that a diploma requirement had a manifest relationship to its interest in quality and efficiency. This, of course, would then force the Griggs plaintiffs to
show a less discriminatory alternative which still maintained that
manifest relationship in quality and efficiency. Since no plaintiff has
ever succeeded at that, it appears that the Griggs plaintiffs would
fail as well.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Because the basic facts of Griggs and Joint Apprenticeship are
so eerily close and the outcomes so drastically different, it is obvious
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. at 91.
401 U.S. at 424.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 430 n.6 (citing the 1960 census statistics for North Carolina).
Id. at 426.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 436.
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that Griggs has been dramatically altered. What is less obvious but
just as true is that Griggs and the entire disparate impact theory

has, for all practical purposes, been reversed and rejected by Wards
Cove. Wards Cove rejects the Congressional intent of "prohibiting
an employer from discriminating in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities. . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national ori-

gin."'319 Title VII and Congressional intent also demonstrate a desire
that qualifications be the controlling factor in employment decisions.

This is evidenced by the very narrow exception to a discriminatory
practice, the exception being one of business necessity.320 For the
foregoing reasons, this author recommends the adoption of the Fair

Employment Reinstatement Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1990 in
an effort to restore the disparate impact doctrine to the Griggs

standard. 321

319. Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)(1972).
320. Like any other exception to a broad prohibition, the business necessity exception
should be narrowly tailored.
321. As noted in Footnote 237 supra, this author does have some concerns about the
inclusion of punitive damages and jury trials in a Civil Rights Act. Historically, these Acts
have been remedial in nature and conciliatory in tone. The addition of punitive damages may
only increase the animosity between employer and employee. With the addition of punitive
damages will come the rejection of reinstatement, and this defeats the purpose of the statute.
However, the addition of increased incidental damages (for emotional distress, humiliation,
etc.) may be an appropriate compromise.
As noted earlier, this author feels that jury trials will only succeed in giving a voice to the
hostile group of citizens who are currently lashing out at some mythical form of oppression
known as "reverse discrimination."
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